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Abstract. This paper will analyze the self-reinforcing coevolutionary process of 
innovation, based on the framework of evolutionary ecology and population genetics. 
In particular, central to this analysis Fisher's runaway process, which demonstrates 
the coevolution of the quality of products and the preferences of consumers in our 
context. The four main points this paper seeks to make are as follows. First, it can be 
concluded from a matching model of supply and demand that when a consumer who has 
a preference for high quality discovers aproduct of high quality in the market, he/she 
will certainly purchase that product. Second, taking account of both the high survival 
rate of a firm that supplies a product of high quality and the cost to the firm of 
improving the quality, evolutionarily stable Fisher's process can be explained. Third, 
however, considering the misfortune of a consumer who has a too-high preference, 
Fisher's process will disappear. Fourth, with the existence of power-users or the effect 
of the negative bias of innovation, Fisher's process can be recovered. 
       Keywords: innovation, evolution, runaway process, startup roblem 
                 JEL Classification: L13, L51, L86
           Address: 
         Takanori Ida 
Faculty of Economics, Kyoto University, 
Yoshida, Sakyo, Kyoto 606-8501, Japan 
    Tel&Fax: +81- 75-753-3477 
   E-mail: ida@econ.kyoto-u.ac jp
1
1 Introduction
        It is evolutionary economics that studies a mechanism that introduces 
novelties, innovations, and inventions to an economic system and also discusses the 
cumulative causation processes, the lock-in phenomena, and the path dependence'. An 
important concept in evolutionary economics is `population thinking' (see Mayr 1959, 
Metcalfe 1998). This claims that a variety of* characteristics within a population are 
the prerequisite for evolutionary change; thus the statistical. moments -of the population 
distributions of characteristics, uch as mean, variance, and covariance, and their rates 
of change over time provide the measures of the rate and direction of evolution. This 
paper will deal with the evolutionary development of innovation, based on the 
population thinking. 
       The process of the diffusion of innovation is often regarded as a startup 
problem2. The startup problem is similar to a chicken-and-egg problem between 
' Following classical evolutionary economists such as Marshall, Veblen, Schumpeter, Alchian, anumber 
of modem evolutionary economists have recently emerged. Typical examples are Nelson and Winter 
(1984), Dosi et al. (1988), Hodgson (1994), Witt (1993), Anderson (1994), Freeman (1982), Antonelli and 
De Liso (1997), Dosi (2000), Andersen (2001). According to Grupp (1998), there are three assumptions 
in modem evolutionary economics: (1) limitedly rational p ayers negotiate at the micro-level; (2) 
transactions arenot equilibrium oriented and can therefore occur away from equilibrium'state; nd (3) 
markets and other facilities define the selection mechanisms between heterogeneous institutions and 
technical facilities. 
2 It is in fact a difficult question toprecisely define what innovation is. According to Sundbo (1998), 
innovation can be classified into the following types: (1) a new product or a new service, (2) a new 
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supply and demand: consumers attach no value to products unless the sufficient supply 
of the products of good quality in the future is guaranteed, while suppliers of the 
products do not want to provide them unless the sufficient demand in the future is not 
expected. A question now arises: which should precede the development of innovation, 
supply or demand? The answer is that the interaction of both is necessary. Without 
the positive interaction between the supply-side and the demand-side, new technologies 
or new services will not become more wide spread. 
       There are many failures in the development of innovation. On the one hand, 
we know new services whose technologies were almost completed but which failed to 
take off because they could not stimulate the initial demand sufficiently. Examples of 
this type are Picturephone by AT&T, Minitels by France Telecom, N-ISDN by NTT and 
so on (cf., Rohlfs 2001). On the other hand, there are new technologies whose 
potential demands were large enough but whose technical difficulties could not be 
solved, so that they have not yet been able to break through. Examples of them are 
electro-mobile, linear-motor-car, and alternative nergy of petroleum. 
       However, the few but impressive successes of the interactions of supply and 
demand should not be forgotten. Consumers always tend to demand new 
technologies/services of higher quality. Responding to the strong demands of
production process, (3) a new organizational or management structure, and (4) a new type of marketing or 
overall behavior in the market. 
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consumers, suppliers try to provide innovative technologies/services. Since consumers 
are willing to purchase such high quality products within their budget constraints, 
suppliers who succeed in developing them will very likely survive the market 
competition and furthermore try to develop products of even higher quality. On the 
other hand, consumers who have preferences for higher quality are satisfied with the 
purchase of such products and demand the further improvements of 
technologies/services. As a result, a series of innovations will be constantly 
encouraged. Examples of these are the performance of computer's MPU and the 
broad-bandwidth of data communication. 'Mecalfe's law' and 'Moore's law' are 
interesting hypotheses that describe the successful developments of 
technologies/services: the former claims that the value of a user grows proportionally 
with the square of the number of users, while the latter suggests that the computing 
performance-to-price ratio doubles every 18 months. Of course, although they are not 
scientific laws in a strict sense, they seem to aptly demonstrate the successful 
coevolution of supply and demand in the current information-communication services. 
       It will be interesting to analyze the self-reinforcing coevolutionary process of. 
innovation, based on the framework of population genetics (cf. Falconer 1981, Bulmer 
1985). `Fisher's law' in population genetics establishes the law of motion of average 
fitness,. and thus of the relative frequencies of the related characteristics, as a function of 
the higher moments of the distribution of the latter. `Fisher's runaway process' is very 
interesting and suggestive (cf. Fisher 1915). Male mating behavior often involves the 
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display of extravagant ornamentation accompanied by loud and complex songs and the 
release of volatile secretions. To understand the evolution of these exaggerated 
secondary sexual characteristics, Fisher suggested that he advantage of preference lies 
in the choice of .mates who will father attractive sons. If females on average prefer a 
particular male trait, then males with that rait have a mating advantage and, if the trait 
is heritable, females with the preference have male offspring similarly adorned who also 
enjoy a mating advantage. See Pomiankowski et al. (1991, p.1422) for further 
discussion. Metcalfe (1998) is a pioneer of those who apply Fisher's law to economics. 
Metcalfe's point can be summarized as follows. Different forms of organization can 
engender different levels of profitability, and these latter imply the different rate and 
direction of technological change. Assuming there is average technology in terms of 
costs or quality-adjusted price, the relative conomic weight of a product, and thus of a 
technology, changes according to its distance from the average performance within the 
technology set.
       The main points this paper seeks to make are as follows. First, it can be 
concluded from a matching model of supply and demand that when a consumer who has 
a preference for high quality discovers a product of high quality in the market, he/she 
will certainly purchase that product. Second, taking account of both the high survival 
rate of a firm that supplies a product of high quality and the cost to the firm of 
improving the quality, evolutionarily stable Fisher's runaway process can be explained. 
Third, however, considering the. misfortune of a consumer who has a too-high 
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preference for high quality, Fisher's process will disappear. Fourth, with the existence 
of power-users or the effect of the negative bias of innovation, Fisher's process can be 
recovered. In this way, this paper will investigate Fisher's runaway processes under 
various conditions and reach some interesting results. The paper consists of the 
following five sections. Section 2 describes a matting model. Section 3 sets up a 
basic model for describing the interaction between supply and demand. Section 4 
analyzes various additional conditions, developing the basic model, whilst Section 5 
draws a conclusion. 
2 Matting model 
       In this section, a matting model between supply and demand will be 
established, and the relationship between the preference for quality and the purchase 
decision of consumers will be investigated. A consumer goes to the market, searches 
for various products, purchases a product if he/she is pleased with it or does not 
purchase it if he/she is not. One period ends when the consumer exits from the market 
because of the constraints of time and . budget. To make the analysis simple, we 
assume that one firm supplies only one product. The timing of the model is depicted 
in Fig. 1. 
      <Fig. 1> 
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       Basic definitions are given as follows: 
  n kinds of products: i=1,...,n 
 the quality of product is xi; 0 s xi 
 the probability that a consumer discovers product i in the market in one period: pi 
 the probability that a consumer purchases product i when he/she discovers it: qi 
 the strength of the preference of a consumer for the quality of products: y; 0:5 y 
 the utility which a consumer with preference y gets from purchasing product is 
   Ui= U(xih9; 0U1 / 3xi > 0 
 the cost which a consumer with preference ypays for purchasing product is 
   Ci=C(xily); o9Ci / axi > 0 
 the unit utility of product i, defined as the utility divided by the cost: 
   Wi=W(xiIy)= U/Ci. 
       We suppose that a consumer determines the bundle of probabilities, (q1,...,q.), 
representing whether he/she should purchase products or not when he/she discovers 
them in the market. Letting the operator of expectation be E, the expected unit-utility 
that the consumer gets from consuming product i in a particular period of time is 
expressed as follows: 
        EW (q1, ...,q ) = (1) 
                  iWmCi 
The numerator of Eq. (1) means the expected utility, and the denominator, the expected 
cost. To calculate the bundle of probabilities, (qi*,...,qn*), which maximizes the 
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expected unit-utility, the partial derivative of the expected unit utility with respect o qk 
is given as follows: 
       aEW 
_ PkCk (Uk - EW). (2)         "`1k T iptgiCi k
The term qk is a probability lying in [0,11; thus the consumer will certainly purchase 
product k, namely qk=l, if its unit utility, UkICk, is larger than the expected unit utility, 
EW The converse holds for qk=0. Supposing U/Cl>U2/C2>...>U,IIC,Y for the sake of 
simplicity, we obtain qk*=l and qk+j*=0 for k such as UVCk>EW(ql*,...,qn*)>Uk+i/Ck,,.
       We assume here that the unit utility of product i increases with its quality, 
namely aW / o9xt > 0 . Given Wi= U/Ci, this assumption can be replaced by the 
following inequality: 
        dui ldxl l O~Ci l Q1J~i 
> 1. 
        Ui I xi Ci /xi (3) 
The left-hand side of Eq. (3) represents he elasticity of utility to cost, and it follows that 
unit utility is an increasing function with respect to quality if the value of the elasticity 
is larger than 1. Since parameter y denotes the strength of the preferences of 
consumers for quality, we may assume that he elasticity is an increasing function with 
respect to y, namely d 2W / ox, y > 0 . Consequently, 8W / Ox, > 0 holds for a 
sufficiently high level of preference y*. For example, letting the utility function be 
UU(xI y)=xt and the cost function be Cjxiy)=cxi, the condition that the elasticity of the 
unit utility is larger than 1 is y*>l. From these remarks, the following result is 
obtained:
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    Proposition 1. When a consumer who has a preference for high quality discovers a 
    product of higher quality than some specific level, he/she will certainly purchase 
    that product. On the other hand, when he/she discovers a product of lower quality 
    than some specific level, he/she will never purchase that product. 
       Based on the proposition above, we will consider the dynamic interaction 
between supply and demand. Since a consumer has a preference for high quality, 
he/she purchases a product not of low quality but of high quality. Thus a firm that 
supplies a product of high quality can survive the market competition and tries to 
develop a product of even higher quality. By contrast, a firm that supplies a product of 
poor quality cannot survive and must be selected through the market mechanism. 
Therefore, the quality of products tends to improve and, at the same time, the required 
level by consumers tends to rise. A process in which both quality and preference 
evolve is called here `Fisher's runaway process' after its advocate; Fig. 2 depicts 
Fisher's process. In the following section, we will establish the model for analyzing 
the dynamic interaction between supply and demand. 
       <Fig. 2> 
3 Dynamic model I
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       In this section, we will propose a model for describing the interaction between 
supply and demand. To begin with, a fundamental equation which describes the 
dynamics of the average values of the quality of products and the preferences of 
consumers. Next, the dynamics of the survival rate of a firm will be examined.
3.1 Fundamental equation
       Letting both the quality of product, x, and the preferences of consumers, y, be 
t random variables, we will study a fundamental equation describing how their average 
values, Ex and Ey, change over time. Added to the definitions given in the previous 
section, we define further variables as follows: let the variances of x and y be Vx and Vy 
and the covariance between x and y be R; let the. survival rate of a firm that supplies a 
product of quality x be S, and the level of satisfaction, in other words of the continuing 
rate of the consumption activity, of a consumer who has a preference y be Dy. In this 
case, we can formalize the evolution of the two mean values, Ex and Ey, by using the 
variances, Vx and Vy, and the covariance, R in the following equations: 
      dEx /dt = Vx(alogSx /ax)+ R(alogDy /ay) 
      dEy / dt = R(a log S,r I ax) + Vy (a log Dy / ay) (4) 
        evaluated at x=Ex, y=Ey. 
Eqs. (4) are the same type as the fundamental equation concerning the additive genetic 
values in population genetics (cf. Lande 1981, Iwasa et al. 1991). See Appendix I for 
further detail.
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3.2 Dynamic model with the survival rate of a firm 
       At this point, we will analyze adynamic model with the survival rate of a firm 
that supplies the product of quality x. It follows from Proposition 1 that he higher the 
quality of products, x, and the preferences of consumers, y are, the higher the survival 
rate of the firm, S, is. Specifying the survival power of the firm by the product of x 
and y, we assume that the survival rate, S, increases exponentially with the survival 
power, xy; on the other hand, we assume at this point that the continuing rate of the 
consumption activity is constant. The terms used below, a, b, c, d, k and 1, are 
parameters. To sum up, we obtain the following equations: 
        Sx = ke`y 
Dy =1. (5) 
Substituting Eqs. (5) into Eqs. (4), we obtain the following equations: 
       dExldt=aVxEY 
       dEy / dt = aREE. (6) 
The equilibrium of Eqs. (6) is the x-axis, Ey=O. The line of equilibrium is unstable, 
and thus Ex and Ey diverge ndlessly in the first quadrant if they are out of equilibrium, 
as depicted in Fig. 3; see Appendix II for further analysis of the equilibrium. It is true 
that we can consider Fisher's runaway process as a process that diverges from the 
equilibrium, but it is unlikely that the preferences of consumers and the quality of 
products actually coevolve indefinitely. This strange result is based on the assumption 
3 Additionally, we need to assume 0 Sx s 1 and O :r. Dy s 1, but at this point we do not ake account 
of these conditions to make the analysis simple. 
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 that the survival rate, S, increases exponentially with the quality of product, x. 
       <Fig. 3> 
        Then, we go on to suppose that firms have to pay the cost to improve the 
quality of products, x. Firms have to invest a lot of money in the R&D activities, and 
the payment often bears down on the corporate finances and sometimes makes firms go 
bankrupt. Letting the negative effect of the payment on the survival rate of a firm be 
the square of the quality of product, -x2, the following equations are obtained: 
a 
          Sx ke`'e-bx 
        Dy =1. (7) 
Substituting Eqs. (7) into Eqs. (4), the following equations are obtained: 
        dEx / dt = Vx (aEy -- 2bEx )
       dEy / dt = R(aEv - 2bEx ). (8) 
The equilibrium of Eqs. (8) is line Ey=(2b/a)Ex. The stability of the equilibrium 
depends on parameter conditions: it is stable if al2b<VJR, while unstable if a/2b>VJR; 
Fig. 4 illustrates the case of the former. Parameter b means the degree of the effect of 
the cost to improve the quality of products. Thus there is an evolutionarily stable 
trajectory in which both x and y at first coevolve and then converge, to the equilibrium, 
in the case where the payment parameter, b is so large that the stability condition, 
a/2b<VxIR, holds4. It is possible to interpret this case as an example of Fisher's 
4 We can suppose the cost for improving quality as other higher-order functions instead of quadratic 
function, -x2. For example, assuming quartic function, -x4, the equilibrium will become Ey=(4bla)Ex3; it 
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runaway process that is stably converging. See Appendix II for the further analysis of 
the equilibrium. The results can be summarized as follows: 
       <Fig. 4> 
  Proposition 2. We have examined two effects on the survival rate of a firm that 
  supplies the product of quality x: the first tells us that the survival rate of the firm 
  increases with the interaction of quality x and preference y; the second informs us that 
 it decreases with the payment for improving quality x. Either effect by itself cannot 
  explain Fisher's runaway process in which both x and y at first coevolve and then 
 converge to the equilibrium. On the other hand, both effects combine to be able to 
 display that evolutionarily stable process. 
       The point here is that not only the interaction between quality x and 
preference y but also the cost for improving quality x must be taken into consideration 
so that Fisher's process is regarded as a stably converging process towards the 
equilibrium. 
4 Dynamic model II
is unstable if x and y are small while stable if x and y are large. 
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       In this section, we will expand the dynamic model, including the level of 
satisfaction of consumers, which was not considered in the previous section. 
4.1 Dynamic model with the level of satisfaction of consumers 
        It is problematic to assume the level of satisfaction of consumers to' be 
constant; for example, it may be that a consumer who has a too-high preference for 
quality cannot be as satisfied as other consumers who have lower preferences for quality 
because the consumer with the too-high preference hardly ever discovers a product 
corresponding to the preference in the market. Letting the negative effect of the too-
high preference on the level of satisfaction, or the continuing rate of the consumption 
activity, of consumers be the square of the preference, y2, we obtain the following 
equations: 
z 
          Sx = ke'ye-bx 
                                    (9)           D
y = le-C'Z 
Substituting Eqs. (9) into Eqs. (4), we obtain the following equations: 
       dEx /dt = Vx (aEy - 2bEx) - 2cREy                                     (10) 
       dEy I dt = R(aEE - 2bEx) - 2cVVEy. 
The equilibrium ofEqs. (10) is the origin. This is because we obtain (VxVV-R2)Ey=O by 
setting dEjdt=O and dEjdt=0; because ofa rule between variance and covariance, VxVy-
R2>O always holds; thus we see Ey=O; similarly we see Ex=O. Furthermore, turning to 
the analysis of the stability of the equilibrium, it follows that points out of the 
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i equilibrium necessarily converge to the equilibrium along line aE, - 2bEx = o , as 
depicted in Fig. 5; see Appendix II for further analysis of the equilibrium. It may be 
that we can interpret Fisher's runaway process as a temporally dis-equilibrium 
phenomenon until converging to the equilibrium, but such a process does not last for a 
long periods. An example is shown- in Fig. 6, where both the average quality of 
products, Ex, and the average preference of consumers, Ey, increase only in the 
beginning short period, then start to decrease, and lastly converge to zero. From these 
remarks, the following result is obtained: 
       <Figs. 5 and 6> 
   Proposition 3. When we consider the possibility that a consumer with a too-high 
   preference is less satisfied, Fisher's runaway process that is evolutionarily stable 
   disappears; at best, Fisher's process is regarded only as a temporally dis-
   equilibrium phenomenon. 
4.2 Conditions on which Fisher's process is recovered 
       We have seen that evolutionarily stable Fisher's process disappears if we 
consider the misfortune of a consumer with a too-high preference. However, we 
5 This result isquite robust; insofar s we assume D
., = le-"2 , the solution fthis ystem is always Ey=O, 
regardless of the functional form of Sx 
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actually know a few impressive successes among new technologies/services, which can 
be interpreted as examples of Fisher's process that is evolutionarily stable. Let us 
investigate conditions under which we can see Fisher's process at work again. 
       The first step is to suppose that there are consumers who can be contented 
with their having higher preferences thann others, even if they cannot discover 
appropriate products corresponding to their preferences. This type of consumer can be 
regarded as a 'power-user,' who gets utility from such peculiar. preferences. Taking 
account of the effect that the difference between an individual preference and the 
average preference of a population, y-Ey, increases the level of satisfaction of the 
consumers, Dy, we obtain the following equations: 
          Sx = ke''e-bx2 
               -~2 d(Y-EY) (11)         D
y = le e . 
Substituting Eqs. (11) into Eqs. (4), we obtain the following equations. 
      dEx/dt=V (aEE-2bEx)+R(d--2cEy) 
(12)        dE
Y / dt = R(aEE - 2bEx) + Vy (d -- 2cEy ). 
The equilibrium of Eqs. (12) is a non-zero point in the first quadrant, (Ex=ad/4bc, 
Ey=dr2c). Furthermore, the equilibrium is stable; there is a trajectory in which both the 
average quality of products, E, and the average preference of consumers, Ey, at first 
increase, then slow down, and lastly converge to the equilibrium, as depicted in Fig. 7. 
An example of the coevolution of Ex and E,, over time is also shown in Fig. 8.
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<Figs. 7 and 8>
       The second step is to suppose that innovation has an adverse effect (negative 
bias) on the survival rate of a firm that is engaged in innovative R&D activities (cf. 
Pomiankowski et al. 1991 about the negative bias). Frequently, new 
technologies/services that firms have endeavored to develop cause consumers to lose 
interest in these products contrary to firms' intention and, in this way, have negative 
effects on the survival rate of firms. Taking account ofthis negative bias of innovation, 
-u, we obtain the following equations: 
       dEx ldt =Vx(aEy --2bEx)-2cREy -u 
       dEy ldt = R(aEy - 2bEx) - 2cVyEy. (13) 
The equilibrium ofEqs. (13) is a point but the origin, [Ex=u(aR-2cVy)/4bc(VxVy-R2), 
E =(u/2c)RI(VxVy-R2)J; we see that Ey>0 always holds and Ex>D holds in the case of 
a/2c>VJR. Furthermore, the equilibrium is stable; thus there is a trajectory in which 
both the average quality of products, Ex, and the average preference of consumers, EE, at 
first increase, then slow down, and lastly converge tothe equilibrium, given al2c>VJR ;
we can depict -them parallel to Figs. 7 and 8. From these remarks, the following result 
is obtained:
Proposition 4. If there are power-users who can directly get utilities from their 
higher preferences or if innovation has a negative bias on the survival rate of firms, 
Fisher's runaway process that is stably converging towards the equilibrium can be
17
    recovered. 
5 Conclusion 
This paper has discussed the interaction between supply and demand in the 
development of innovation, based on the framework of evolutionary ecology and 
population genetics. In particular, we have focused on Fisher's runaway process 
representing the fact that more than two characteristics coevolve. All propositions that 
have been established can be summarized in Table 1. 
       <Table 1> 
       Only with the survival rate of firms, Fisher's process becomes one of 
convergence towards the stable equilibrium. However, if the level of satisfaction of 
consumers is added to the model, then Fisher's process is regarded as a temporally dis-
equilibrium process at best. These conclusions can aptly explain why many new 
technologies/services could not overcome the start-up problems. However, with 
another condition, such as the existence of power-users or the negative bias of 
innovation, Fisher's process can be recovered as evolutionarily stable. 
       In conclusion, we have obtained interesting results concerning Fisher's 
runaway process of innovation: there are various types of process in which the quality 
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of products and the preferences of consumers coevolve; without specific conditions, 
stably converging coevolution will not be fulfilled. 
Appendix I. The Derivation of the fundamental equation 
        The fundamental equation (4) can be. derived in the following way. First of all, we 
define the basic variables a follows: 
    the number ofthe products of quality x that a consumer with preference y discovers in a period: 
      nxy 
    the total number ofthe products that consumers di cover ina period: N = x y nxy 
    the average value of the quality of products: EX = x y xnxy / N 
    the variance of the quality of products: Vx = x y (x - Ex) 2 n, , / N 
    the average value of the quality of the products that can survive inthe next period: 
        Ex,+1= x,yx'Sxnxy x,YSxnx' 
At this point, defining the survival rate of a firm as Sx = S(x, y) , the change ofthe average value 
of the quality of product, Ex, can be expressed as follows: 
  AE,, = Ex,+i - Ex 
     _ x,yxS(x, y)nxy II I x,y S(x, y)n, - x,yxnxy I N 
           x,yxS(x, y)n yIN - ( x,yxny I N)(Y.I x.y S(x, y)n,, IN)] 
      /(I I x,y S(x, y)nxy IN)
    = Cov(x,S(x, y))IE(S(x, y)). 
Note here that Cov denotes variance and E denotes expectation. Next, by applying a Taylor 
expansion to S(x, y) around (Ex, Ey) , the following equation is obtained: 
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  Cov(x, S(x, y)) - Cov(x, S(EX, Ey) + aS(x, y) / ax(x - Ex) + aS(x, y) / ay(y - E y )) 
     = S(Ex, Ey)Cov(x,l) +(aS(x, y) / ax)Cov(x, x - Ex) + (aS(x, y) / ay)Cov(x, y - Ey ) 
     = Vx (aS(x, y) / ax) + R(aS(x, y) 1,0y) 
    Cov(x,l) = 0, Cov(x, x - E,,) = V, Cov(x, y -- Ey) - R). 
Furthermore, by applying a Taylor expansion to E(S(x, y)) around (EX, Ey) , the following 
equation is obtained: 
 E(S(x, y)) = E(S(Ex, Ey) + (aS(x, y) / ax)(x - Ex) + (aS(x, y) l ay)(y - Ey ) 
    = S(Ex, Ey) + (aS(x, y) / ax)E(x - Ex) + (aS(x, y) l ay)E(y - Ey ) 
     = S(EE,EE) 
   E(x-Ex) =E(y-Ey) = 0). 
From what has been stated, the following equation is obtained concerning the average quality of 
products, Ex 
 AEx = Cov(x, S(x, y)) / E(S(x, y)) 
    = CVx (aS(x, y) / ax) + R(aS(x, y) / ay)] S(Ex, EE ) 
     = Vx (a log S(x, y) / (3x) + R(a log S(x, y) / ay) I x-&,y-Ey . 
Similarly, the following equation is obtained concerning the average preference of consumers, Ey : 
 ©Ey = R(a log D(x, y) / ax) + Vy (a log D(x, y) / ay) Ix_a,y_EY .
Appendix II. The analysis of the equilibrium
       The eigenvalue of matrix 0 aV,, corresponding to Eqs. (5) is {0, aR}; the equilibrium                            0aR) 
of Eqs. (5) is unstable because of aR>0. The igenvalue of matrix - 2b(l' x aVs corresponding to 
                                             k-2bR a )
Eqs. (8) is {0, aR-2bVx}; the equilibrium of Eqs. (8) is stable if aR-2bVx<O, while unstable if aR-
                                -2bV aV - 2cR 
2bVx>0. The eigenvalue of matrix x z corresponding to Eqs. (10) is 
                               -2bR aR - 2cV,,
20
  (aR - 2bVx - 2cVy + (aR - 2bVx - 2cV1,) 2 + 16bc(VxVy -R2) ) ; the sign of the eigenvalue 2 
depends on parameters; eigenvalues are f-0.169636,-0.00536444} in the case of a=b=0.5, c=0.0125, 
d=0.05, V =Vy=0.2, R=0.06, as assumed in Fig. 7, and therefore the equilibrium of Eqs. (10) is 
stable. The same analysis can be applied to Eqs. (12) and (13). 
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Fig. 1. The timing of the model in one period 
  Going to the market 
  Discovering product i and buying it
  Discovering product j but not buying it
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Fig. 3. Evolutionarily unstable runaway 
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Fig. 4. Evolutionarily stable runaway 












Fig. 5. Temporally dis-equilibrium runaway 
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Fig. 6. An example of a trajectory depicted in Fig. 5 
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Fig. 7. Evolutionarily stable runaway 
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Table 1. Various aspects of Fisher's runaway process
Factors of the model
    The survival rate of a firm: 
(1) the interaction of supply and demand
      The survival rate of a firm: 
  (1) the interaction of supply and demand; 
(2) the cost for improving the quality of products.
         The survival rate of a firm: 
     (1) the interaction of supply and demand; 
   (2) the cost for improving the quality of products 
     The level of satisfaction of consumers: 
(1) the misfortune of a consumer with too-high preference
          The survival rate of a firm: 
     (1) the interaction of supply and demand; 
   (2) the cost for improving the quality of products 
      The level of satisfaction of consumers: 
(1) the misfortune of a consumer with too-high preference; 
         (2) the existence of power-users
          The survival rate of a firm: 
     (1) the interaction ofsupply and demand; 
  (2) the cost for improving the quality of products; 
       (3) the negative bias of innovation 
     The level of satisfaction of consumers: 
(1) the misfortune of a consumer with too-high preference
Fisher's runaway process
Unstably diverging process
Stably converging process
Temporally dis-equilibrium process
Stably converging process
Stably converging process
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